Charitable Giving as a Signal of Trustworthiness: Disentangling the Signaling Benefits of Altruistic Acts * It has been shown that psychological predispositions to benefit others can motivate human cooperation and the evolution of such social preferences can be explained with kin or multilevel selection models. It has also been shown that cooperation can evolve as a costly signal of an unobservable quality that makes a person more attractive with regard to other types of social interactions. Here we show that if a proportion of individuals with social preferences is maintained in the population through kin or multi-level selection, cooperative acts that are truly altruistic can be a costly signal of social preferences and make altruistic individuals more trustworthy interaction partners in social exchange. In a computerized laboratory experiment, we test whether altruistic behavior in the form of charitable giving is indeed correlated with trustworthiness and whether a charitable donation increases the observing agents' trust in the donor. Our results support these hypotheses and show that, apart from trust, responses to altruistic acts can have a rewarding or outcome-equalizing purpose. Our findings corroborate that the signaling benefits of altruistic acts that accrue in social exchange can ease the conditions for the evolution of social preferences.
Introduction
Humans frequently cooperate with non-kin others and incur costs to benefit them. The question of how such cooperative behavior can be explained has attracted considerable attention across several decades and disciplines (see West et al. 2011 for a critical review). A large body of literature has shown that cooperation can be a manifestation of self-interest if it is likely to be reciprocated with a benefit that outweighs its costs in the not-too-distant future (Trivers 1971; Axelrod & Hamilton 1981; Nowak & Sigmund 1998) . However, these explanations are restricted to interactions between members of relatively small groups, where cooperators and defectors can be identified and respectively targeted by reward or punishment (Bowles & Gintis 2011: 63-70; Leimar & Hammerstein 2001; Panchanathan & Boyd 2003) . Moreover, empirical evidence has accumulated suggesting that cooperative behavior may be motivated by psychological predispositions to benefit others (henceforth, social preferences) (Camerer 2003: Ch. 2) . However, since cooperative behavior is often costly, the evolution of social preferences in humans is difficult to explain in an individual-selectionist framework (although see Delton et al. 2011 ). This has led to a renewed interest in models of multi-level selection (Wilson 1975; Gintis 2000; Boyd et al. 2003 ).
Models of multi-level selection assume that there is both competition between individuals (within groups) and between groups, and groups with a higher proportion of cooperative individuals will be more likely to survive inter-group competition and adverse environmental conditions. For cooperation to be sustained in a population, positive assortment of cooperators, i.e. the higher likelihood of cooperators interacting with cooperators than with non-cooperators, must outweigh the ratio of costs c (for the cooperator) to benefits b (for the rest of the group) of cooperation (Eshel & Cavalli-Sforza 1982; Bowles & Gintis 2011: 52-59) . However, since models of multi-level selection are mathematically equivalent to models of kin selection where genetic relatedness is implied by the limited dispersal of individuals within groups, some authors have argued that it is not necessary to resort to multi-level selection to explain the evolution of cooperation (West et al. 2011) . We leave it to others to answer questions regarding to what degree population structures led to positive assortment of 3 genetically related individuals in human prehistory and whether multi-level selection is necessary to explain how social preferences and cooperation have evolved. Instead, we argue that cooperative acts can be credible signals of an individual's social preferences and, through favorable treatment of these individuals in social exchange, ease the conditions for their evolution, whether in a kin or a multi-level selection framework. Gintis et al. (2001) show that cooperation can evolve as a costly signal of an unobservable but relevant quality, if this quality is causally related to an individual's ability to cooperate (see also Leimar 1997; Roberts 1998; Lotem et al. 2003; Smith & Bliege Bird 2005) . In the simplest case, there are highquality and low-quality types who incur low costs (c 1 ) or high costs (c 2 > c 1 ), respectively, from sending the signal. If the benefits (s) from being interacted with, conditional on having sent the signal, compensate the high-quality types but not the low-quality types (c 2 > s > c 1 ), only the high-quality types can afford to send it and thus will be identified as such. If, moreover, sending the signal yields a higher net benefit for the sender than not sending the signal, type-separating behavior can evolve in which high-quality types send a signal, low-quality types do not send a signal, and agents are only interacted with if they sent a signal. Gintis et al. (2001) also analyze the evolutionary dynamics of their model and show that cooperation as a type-separating signal is evolutionarily stable under plausible conditions. These predictions also hold if social preferences are the unobservable quality of interest. Agents with social preferences are the high-quality types, who derive a psychological reward (r 1 > 0) from benefiting others, whereas individuals lacking social preferences are the low-quality types, who only care about their own payoffs (r 2 = 0). Although the material costs are the same for both types (c 2 = c 1 = c), the psychological rewards make it "cheaper" for the high-quality type to cooperate (c > c -r 1 ). The condition that must hold for cooperation to be a type-separating signal is c > s ≥ 0. In other words, high-quality types cannot be fully compensated in material terms for the costs they incur. In fact, their 4 cooperative acts must be truly altruistic (henceforth, altruistic acts). This requires that the existence of individuals with social preferences is maintained by another evolutionary mechanism (e.g. kin and/or multi-level selection). However, as long as s > 0, cooperators receive partial compensation, which we call signaling benefits. We will show next that altruistic acts can induce signaling benefits through social exchange and that this can ease the conditions for the evolution of social preferences.
Altruism as a signal of trustworthiness
Social exchange among unrelated individuals has been an important part of human sociality for tens of thousands of years and arguably a driving force in the evolution of the human mind (Cosmides & Tooby 1992) . The upper half of Figure 1b shows a Person X and a Person Y engaging in social exchange that is not based on a formally binding agreement (Dasgupta 1988; Coleman 1990: Ch. 5 ).
The social exchange can be mutually beneficial if Person X makes a transfer x first and Person Y makes a back transfer y, which is tripled to reflect the gains from trade. While a selfish Person Y has a real incentive to keep x without sending back y, a Person Y with social preferences will make a back transfer y, such that 3y > x. For Person X, a trust problem arises as he or she does not know whether Person Y is cooperative and will make a back transfer that is sufficiently high. Referring to the vast social science literature on social exchange (e.g. Ostrom and Walker 2003; Fehr 2009 preferences will both give to charity and make a back transfer in social exchange, Person X can infer Person Y's type from his or her donation to charity or the lack of it. Consequently, while Person Y 2 will be disregarded by Person X, Person Y 1 will be partly compensated for his or her altruistic act by the gains he or she makes from trade (i.e. c′ = c -s, where c are the costs of the altruistic act and s = x -y are the signaling benefits). In addition, since Person X benefits from the social exchange with a trustworthy interaction partner, the benefits for the group (excluding Person Y) increase as well (i.e. b′ = b + 3y -x, where b are the group benefits from Person Y's altruistic act and 3y -x are Person X's gains). Now, as c′/b′ < c/b, signaling eases the conditions for the evolution of social preferences, because it lowers the degree of positive assortment necessary to maintain such traits in the population. This evolutionary argument implies that what we should observe today is that altruistic behavior and trustworthiness are correlated. Moreover, individuals acting altruistically will be trusted more in social exchange because they will be expected to have social preferences and thus to be trustworthy. Note that the reverse is not true in general. That is, observing someone behaving trustworthily does not necessarily tell us that this person has social preferences -he or she could be selfish and behave trustworthily to acquire a reputation for being trustworthy and to be trusted more in the future (Bolton et al. 2004 ). However, here we exclude this possibility with a one-shot (i.e. non-repeated) game design, in which a selfish Person Y has no incentive to act trustworthily and thus altruistic acts can be a signal of trustworthiness via social preferences only.
Previous findings
There is ample evidence for a positive correlation between altruistic behavior and trustworthiness measured in laboratory experiments with economic games (Barclay 2004; Ashraf et al. 2006; Chaudhuri & Gangadharan 2007; Albert et al. 2007; Blanco et al. 2011; Fehrler unpublished; Gambetta & Przepiorka unpublished) . Four of these experiments were also designed to investigate whether subjects who act altruistically are thereafter trusted more by third parties in social exchange, and they find support for this conjecture (Barclay 2004; Albert et al. 2007; Fehrler unpublished;  Gambetta & Przepiorka unpublished). Barclay & Willer (2007) and Sylwester & Roberts (2010) provide similar evidence from experiments with public good games. However, there is experimental evidence showing that subjects who help others or donate more to charity receive more in return from third parties (Wedekind & Milinski 2000; Milinski et al. 2002) . Thus, observing subjects in social exchange responding positively to altruistic acts does not tell us to what extent these responses reflect trust and to what extent they are mere transfers of resources intended to unconditionally reward the altruistic individual. Moreover, there is compelling experimental evidence that some subjects prefer egalitarian outcomes (Bolton & Ockenfels 2000; Dawes et al. 2007; Fehr & Schmidt 1999) . Since altruism entails giving away resources or incurring costs, positive responses to altruistic acts could also be a manifestation of inequality aversion. However, while trust is motivated by pure self-interest, rewards or responses based on inequality aversion are not and would thus remain in need of an evolutionary explanation.
In our computerized laboratory experiment, we test whether altruistic behavior in the form of charitable giving is indeed correlated with trustworthiness. Moreover, we test whether a charitable donation increases the observing agents' trust in the donor. Our experimental design allows us to disentangle trust from rewarding and outcome-equalizing transfers as responses to altruistic acts. (2004) was the first to experimentally combine the dictator game (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994) and the investment game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995) to disentangle trustworthiness expectations from other motives behind trusters' decisions. He finds that trusters send higher amounts in the investment game than in the dictator game and attributes this difference to trusters' trustworthiness expectations. In our experiment, we take a similar approach. We give Person Y subjects the opportunity to donate part of their endowment to a charitable organization and disentangle the motives behind responses to these altruistic acts by using Person X subjects' transfers in the dictator game and the exchange game (a variant of the investment game). 
Methods
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Measuring trust and trustworthiness
Cox (2004) suggests that the difference between a transfer in the exchange game and in the dictator game measures trust because it nets out responses that are based on other motives, leaving the part of the exchange game transfer that is only based on trustworthiness expectations. However, this measure implies that the various motives additively affect subjects' transfer decisions. This assumption has been criticized on the grounds that the two games may put subjects in different mental frames (Fehr 2009 ). It is plausible that the dictator game evokes more altruistic motives in subjects than the exchange game, with the effect that the transfer difference between the two games would underestimate trust.
In our study, we try to meet this objection in two ways. First, we balance the framing effects of the two games by presenting all decision situations to subjects on the same screen. This compels subjects to compare the different situations with each other. Second, we also measure trust in an alternative way. We regress the transfers in the exchange game on the expected back transfers, controlling for other motives by adding the dictator game transfer as a control variable. Then, we hold Person X subjects' dictator game transfers constant and measure their trust as the part of the exchange game transfer that can be attributed to their trustworthiness expectation only. This measure closely matches our definition of trust. Moreover, the regression model allows us to assess the extent to which other motives affect exchange game transfers. A coefficient estimate for dictator game transfers smaller than one would indicate that other motives affect transfers in the exchange game to a lesser extent than in the dictator game. In this case, the transfer difference alone would serve to underestimate trust. 
Experimental design and procedure
To disentangle the motives behind responses to altruistic acts, we vary subjects' endowments, games, and the possibility to donate to a charitable organization in a 2( Subjects make all possible decisions before they are randomly paired with another subject and payoffs are calculated and presented to them. The eight decision situations are presented to Person X subjects on one screen simultaneously. On the subsequent screen, we ask Person X subjects to state their expectations with respect to Person Y subjects' back transfers in the exchange game with hypothetical transfers of CHF 0, 8, and 16. Finally, Person Y subjects are asked to decide upon the amount they want to send back to Person X for every possible amount a Person X could transfer to them. The experimental procedure is described in more detail in the appendix. 
Hypotheses
Our first hypothesis is that donors to charity are more trustworthy than non-donors. We test our first hypothesis by regressing Person Y subjects' back transfers on an interaction of Person Y subjects' type (donor vs. non-donor) with Person X subjects' transfers.
Our second hypothesis is that Person X subjects expect donors to be more trustworthy than non-donors and therefore trust them more. Following the discussion in section 2.2, we test our second hypothesis in two ways. First, we calculate and compare the differences in actual exchange game and dictator game transfers to donors and non-donors (see Figure 2 above). However, a comparison of these differences between donors and non-donors (1e -1d vs. 2e -2d) may be influenced by higher trust in non-donors due to non-donors' higher endowments (i.e. non-donors have more to send back).
Therefore, we also compare transfer differences in the two games between donors and Person Y subjects without an option to donate and a low endowment (1e -1d vs. 4e -4d), as well as between non-donors and Person Y subjects without an option to donate and a high endowment (2e -2d vs. 3e -3d). Second, we regress Person X subjects' exchange game transfers on their transfers in the dictator game and their trustworthiness expectations towards each Person Y type. Based on this regression model estimation, we compute the differences in Person X subjects' exchange game transfers to each
Person Y type that can only be attributed to differences in trustworthiness expectations.
Previous studies' findings suggest that the transfer decisions of Person X subjects may be caused by inequality aversion and/or a preference to reward altruistic acts. We expect to replicate these findings.
That is, we expect to find higher transfers in the dictator game where Person Y has a lower endowment by design (inequality aversion: 4d > 3d) and to find still higher transfers in the dictator game where Person Y has a lower endowment because he or she donated to charity (preference to reward altruistic acts: 1d > 4d). Also, in accord with the results obtained in previous experiments with charitable giving (Albert et al. 2007; Milinski et al. 2002) , we expect to find higher transfers to donors than to non-donors in both the dictator (1d > 2d) and the exchange game (1e > 2e).
Results
Charitable giving and trustworthiness
Of the 42 Person X subjects who had the opportunity to make a donation, 26 (62%) chose to do so. Table A2 in the appendix). Moreover, the slope coefficients for donors and nondonors in the regression of back transfers on transfers are significantly different at the 10% level (t = 12 1.71, p = 0.094). This shows that donors reciprocate higher transfers with higher back transfers than non-donors (see Table A3 in the appendix). Table A2 in the appendix.
Trust I
Our first measure of trust is the difference between exchange game and dictator game transfers. Figure   4 shows Person X subjects' average transfers in the eight different decision situations (the first two bars in each three-bar grouping) and Table 2 lists the transfer differences discussed in the following. In accord with previous studies' findings, we observe a substantial and statistically significant difference between exchange game transfers to donors and non-donors ( Notes: The numbers 1d through 4e in the second column denote Person X transfers in each of the eight decision situations (see Figure 2) . The Wald tests of simple and composite linear hypotheses are based on the OLS regression model presented in Table  A6 in the appendix.
This measure of trust yields a positive but statistically insignificant difference between donors and non-donors. Comparing the transfer differences of donors and Person Y subjects without the option to donate and a low endowment yields a similar result. The difference is positive but also statistically insignificant (Table 2 , row 4). However, when we compare the transfer differences of non-donors and
Person Y subjects without the option to donate and a high endowment, we find a substantial and statistically significant negative difference (Table 2 , row 5).
According to the discussion in section 2.2, the difference between exchange game and dictator game transfers alone may underestimate trust because other motives may affect exchange game transfers to a smaller extent than dictator game transfers. Moreover, looking at a direct measure of trustworthiness expectations may be more informative. If Person X subjects' expectations about donors' and nondonors' trustworthiness do not differ as predicted by our second hypothesis, then arguments based on costly signaling can be ruled out. Table A4 in the appendix). Moreover, regressing expected back transfers on hypothetical transfers yields a significantly larger slope coefficient for donors than for non-donors (F 1,55 = 12.56, p < 0.001) and for donors than for unequally endowed Person Y subjects without a possibility to donate (F 1,55 = 5.06, p = 0.029). This indicates that subjects expect higher transfers to be reciprocated by higher back transfers from donors and provides evidence for motives based on trustworthiness expectations in the exchange game (see Table A5 in the appendix). But do Person X subjects act on their trustworthiness expectations?
Trust II
To answer this question, we regress Person X subjects' transfers in the exchange game on their transfers in the dictator game and their trustworthiness expectations about the four Person Y types (see Model M1 in Table A7 in the appendix). First of all, the coefficient estimate for dictator game transfers is 0.616 and significantly smaller than one (F 1,55 = 34.17, p < 0.001). This indicates that other motives affect transfers in the exchange game to a lesser extent than in the dictator game and that the difference between exchange game and dictator game transfers is an overly conservative measure of trust. Therefore, based on this model estimation, we compute the part of Person X subjects' exchange game transfers that can only be attributed to their trustworthiness expectations. In Figure 4 , the third bar in each three-bar group shows this measure of trust towards the four Person Y types. These figures show that, on average, Person X subjects transfer CHF 0.45 more to donors than to non-donors because they expect donors to be more trustworthy than non-donors (z = 2.79, p = 0.005). For the same reason, Person X subjects transfer on average CHF 0.29 more to donors than to unequally endowed Person Y subjects without a possibility to donate (z = 2.53, p = 0.011). The largest difference in exchange game transfers that can be attributed to the difference in trustworthiness expectations is between non-donors and equally endowed Person Y subjects without a possibility to donate and amounts to CHF 0.56 (z = 2.21, p < 0.027). These results support our second hypothesis.
Other motives
Finally, our study replicates previous findings. First, the amounts transferred in the dictator game with
Person Y having a lower endowment are significantly higher, indicating that inequality aversion is important (Table 2 , row 6). Second, the fact that, in the dictator game, donors to charity receive higher transfers than subjects without an opportunity to donate suggests that some subjects have a preference to reward altruistic acts (Table 2 , row 7). Our evidence also suggests that non-donors are punished (Table 2 , row 8).
Discussion
Empirical evidence suggests that human cooperation can be motivated by social preferences, and the evolution of social preferences can be explained with kin or multi-level selection models. However, it has been shown that cooperation can also evolve as a costly signal of an unobservable but relevant quality, if this quality is causally related to an individual's ability to cooperate. We propose that if a proportion of individuals with social preferences is maintained in the population through kin or multilevel selection, cooperative acts that are truly altruistic can signal trustworthiness, and the signaling benefits that accrue in social exchange can ease the conditions for the evolution of social preferences.
In social exchange, trust problems arise as an actor does not know whether his or her potential exchange partners are cooperative or not. However, since a person with social preferences will both engage in altruistic behavior and be cooperative in social exchange, the actor can infer his or her potential partners' types from their altruistic behavior and choose a trustworthy partner accordingly.
Then, the gains from trade partly compensate the altruistic individuals for their altruistic acts and increase overall group benefits through the actor's gains. This eases the conditions for the evolution of social preferences, because it lowers the degree of positive assortment necessary to maintain such traits in the population.
This account of the evolution of altruistic behavior in humans implies that what we should observe today is that, first, altruistic behavior and trustworthiness are correlated and, second, altruists are expected to be more trustworthy and therefore are trusted more in social exchange. However, observing agents' positive responses to altruistic acts in social exchange does not tell us to what extent these responses reflect trust and to what extent they are only rewarding or outcome-equalizing transfers of resources. Our experimental design allows us to isolate trust from these other responses.
Our evidence is consistent with our hypotheses. First, we find that donors to charity, despite the fact that they have less to transfer back, transfer back significantly higher amounts in social exchange than non-donors. Second, we find that, in social exchange, subjects transfer significantly higher amounts to donors than to non-donors because they expect to receive back more from donors than from nondonors. We also find evidence that subjects reward donors and punish non-donors in both the dictator and exchange games. Moreover, we find evidence for inequality aversion and endowment effects.
Those who have a lower endowment by design receive more in the dictator game than those who have an equal endowment, but the latter are trusted more in social exchange.
An alternative explanation for our findings could be constructed by combining an indirect reciprocity mechanism that explains the evolution of cooperative strategies with an argument of maladaptation to the game structure of our experiment. Panchanathan and Boyd (2004) show that if a public good game is followed by an infinitely repeated indirect reciprocity game, a strategy that contributes to the public good and thereafter refuses to help free-riders, but helps other contributors in the indirect reciprocity game, can stabilize cooperation in the public good game. Applied to the game structure in our experiment (charitable giving followed by a one-shot exchange game) it is obvious that such a "shunner" strategy would not be evolutionarily stable because it forgoes fitness-enhancing benefits by giving away resources in the last move of the game. However, recently Delton et al. (2011) have convincingly argued that cooperation in one-shot games could be a maladaptation. Since the costs of mistaking a repeated interaction for a one-shot interaction are so much larger than the costs of mistaking a one-shot interaction for a repeated interaction, evolution might have led to motivational and representational systems in the human brain that are specialized in avoiding the first type of error while accepting occasional losses due to the second type of error.
We acknowledge that the behavior we observe could also be explained by indirect reciprocity theory cum maladaptation. Nevertheless, we find our account more plausible because there is ample evidence from lab experiments that subjects are very capable of distinguishing one-shot from repeated games and act accordingly when playing them (Keser & van Winden 2000; Gächter & Falk 2002) . However, it is not our aim to discard other explanations of the evolution of cooperation. Instead, we believe that kin or multi-level selection plus signaling might have complemented mechanisms based on direct and indirect reciprocity in scenarios where repeated interactions and the accurate transmission of information about reputation were unlikely (Roberts and Sherratt 2007; Bowles and Gintis 2011: Ch. 4).
A.1 Experimental procedures
Our main focus was on Person X decisions. However, since we were also interested in the correlation between charitable giving and back transfers in the exchange game, we maximized the number of Person Y subjects in Condition 1 (see Figure 2 in the main text). That is, in every experimental session, only one subject each was assigned to conditions 2 and 3. The remaining Person Y subjects were assigned to Condition 1.
We chose a within-subject design because we wanted Person X subjects to make their decisions based on a direct comparison of the different types of interaction partners and situations -something our research question implies. This may have led subjects to be more consistent in their decisions than had they decided in each situation independently. However, since subjects' decisions were anonymous and incentivized, and they knew that their earnings would be calculated according to their own and their interaction partners' actual decisions, we are confident that possible confounds due to an experimenter demand effect are less of an issue.
Except for the fact that most Person Y subjects were assigned to Condition 1, the experimental setup was common knowledge. All subjects received the same instructions. Instructions explained the decision situations of both Person X and Person Y step by step, contained screen shots of the actual decision screens, tables listing all possible payoff combinations for both games, and a short description of each of the charitable organizations, which all support a humanitarian cause, are well-known and have a good reputation. Moreover, subjects learned that their decisions were anonymous, how their payments would be calculated, that payments would be administered by a person not involved in the implementation of the experiment, and where to retrieve the total donation receipts if they wished to do so. This is done to assure subjects that the donation is real, and to rule out other kinds of reputational concerns thereby reducing experimenter demand effects to a minimum.
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After reading the instructions, subjects took a quiz with questions mainly about the decision situations.
Questions for which at least one wrong answer was given were read out loud and the correct answer was explained to all subjects at the same time. Then, the experiment started. After the experiment, subjects filled in a questionnaire and could leave the lab to get their payment in private.
The experiment was programmed and conducted using the software z-Tree. 1 We conducted one pilot session and seven experimental sessions with 16 subjects each (112+16 subjects in total). An experimental session lasted for about 75 minutes. The pilot session served to test the intelligibility of the instructions and to calibrate the game parameters. Since we reduced the donation amount from CHF 8 to CHF 6 and changed the instructions after the pilot session, the data from the pilot session are not used in the analysis. Subjects were undergraduate students studying in different departments at the University of Zurich. Subjects were addressed via e-mail, were asked to participate in a computerized decision experiment where they could earn some money, and could register online for one of the open sessions. Subjects were male in 43% of the cases and 24.5 ( 0.596, N = 112) years old on average.
Subjects received a CHF 10 show-up fee (at that time approximately USD 9) and earned CHF 15.3 on average in the experiment.
1 Fischbacher, U. (2007) . z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experimental Economics, 10, 171-178. MSF) . N denotes the number of subjects and R 2 denotes the proportion of variance explained by the model. Two subjects are missing because of item non-response. Together with the donation in the pilot session, CHF 174 were raised in total. Donations were highest for MSF (CHF 90) and about the same for AI (CHF 36) and ICRC (CHF 38) . No significant effects of socio-economic variables on charitable giving are observed. Figure 3 ("Person Y behavior") and reported in Section 3.1 in the main article are based on this model estimation. Table A2 , this model imposes a linearity assumption on the relation between Person X subjects' transfers and Person Y subjects' back transfers. Person Y subjects who did not have the possibility to make a donation are not included in the analysis. N1 denotes the number of decisions, N2 denotes the number of subjects and R 2 denotes the proportion of variance explained by the model. Results reported in Section 3.1 in the main article are based on this model estimation. (donor, non-donor, eq. endow. and uneq. endow.) and the three hypothetical transfer levels (CHF 0, 8 and 16), for each of which Person X subjects had to specify the expected back transfer, are fully interacted with each other. N1 denotes the number of statements, N2 denotes the number of subjects and R 2 denotes the proportion of variance explained by the model. Results presented in Figure 3 ("Person X beliefs") and reported in section 3.3 in the main article are based on this model estimation. (donor, non-donor, eq. endow. and uneq. endow.) are the independent variables. Unlike the model reported in Table A4 , this model imposes a linearity assumption on the relation between Person X subjects' hypothetical transfers and expected back transfers. N1 denotes the number of decisions, N2 denotes the number of subjects and R 2 denotes the proportion of variance explained by the model. Results reported in section 3.3 in the main article are based on this model estimation. Notes: The table lists coefficient estimates from an OLS regression with cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 for two-sided tests). The model is estimated without a constant and the dependent variable is Person X subjects' transfers (in CHF). The independent variables, Person Y subjects' types (donor, non-donor, eq. endow. and uneq. endow.) and the two games (dictator game and exchange game), for each combination of which Person X subjects had to specify a transfer, are fully interacted with each other. N1 denotes the number of decisions, N2 denotes the number of subjects and R 2 denotes the proportion of variance explained by the model. Results presented in Figure 4 (first two bars in each tern) and reported in Table 2 (sections 3.2 and 3.4) in the main article are based on this model estimation. Notes: The table lists coefficient estimates from OLS regressions with cluster-robust standard errors (*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 for two-sided tests). In all three models, the dependent variable is Person X subjects' transfers in the exchange games (in CHF). Person Y subjects' types (donor, non-donor, eq. endow. and uneq. endow.), Person X subjects' transfers in the dictator games and Person Y subjects' back transfers as expected by Person X subjects at the three hypothetical transfer levels (CHF 0, 8 and 16) are the independent variables. Model M1 is our main model. M2 and M3 serve as robustness checks. M2 is estimated with individual fixed effects. M3 is a more unrestricted version of M1 and allows for different slopes for the different subgroups. In comparison to M3, M1 assumes equal coefficient estimates for dictator game transfers across Person Y types (the following F-Test confirms that the differences are not statistically different: F3,55 = 0.62, p = 0.606) and equal coefficient estimates for expected back transfers across Person Y types (the following F-Tests for the different transfer levels confirm that the differences are not statistically different: x = 0: F3,55 = 1.50, p = 0.225; x = 8: F3,55 = 1.70, p = 0.177; x = 16: F3,55 = 2.25, p = 0.093). Even though the coefficients for expected back transfers vary between the specifications, their joint influence on transfers is significant in all specifications. N1 denotes the number of decisions, N2 denotes the number of subjects and R
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A.2 Results Tables
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